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Abstract
Blockchain and cryptocurrency are a hot topic in today’s digital world. In this paper, we create a game theoretic model in
continuous time. We consider a dynamic game model of the bitcoin market, where miners or players use mining systems to
mine bitcoin by investing electricity into the mining system. Although this work is motivated by BTC, the work presented
can be applicable to other mining systems similar to BTC. We propose three concepts of dynamic game theoretic solutions
to the model: Social optimum, Nash equilibrium and myopic Nash equilibrium. Using the model that a player represents a
single ‘‘miner’’ or a ‘‘mining pool’’, we develop novel and interesting results for the cryptocurrency world.
Keywords Blockchain  Bitcoin mining  Dynamic game theory  Differential game  Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation 
Social optimum  Nash equilibrium  Myopic Nash equilibrium  Pigovian tax
1 Introduction
A bitcoin is created by miners, using complex mathemat-
ical ‘‘proof of work’’ procedures by computing hashes [8].
For each successful attempt, miners get rewards in terms of
bitcoin and transaction fees. Miners participate in mining
voluntarily in exchange for rewards as income. Electricity
plays an essential role in the bitcoin mining process since
created blocks and solving computationally hard problems
uses large amounts of electricity. We can consider elec-
tricity as a semi-renewable resource—depending on the
source of resources used for its production. The electricity
consumed by the mining systems is directly proportional to
the computational power of the system being used. The fact
is that at each new block creation only one miner will be
rewarded (the one who will win the mining game by first
creating and updating the blockchain). The remaining
miners’ effort, as well as electricity used for mining at that
time, will be wasted. Therefore, optimizing the consump-
tion of electricity is one of the essential and most chal-
lenging problems effecting bitcoin mining.
Bitcoin [19] was introduced in 2009. Its security is
based on a concept known as Proof of Work (POA), and
a transaction is only considered valid once the system
obtains proof that a sufficient amount of computational
work has been exerted by an actively mining node. The
miners (responsible for creating blocks) constantly try to
solve cryptographic puzzles in the form of hash computa-
tions. The process of adding a new block to the blockchain
is called mining and these blocks contain a set of transac-
tions that have been authenticated (confirmed). The aver-
age time to create a new block in the blockchain is 10
minutes. Two types of agents participate in the Bitcoin
network: miners, who validate transactions and clients,
who trade in BTC [4]. The blockchain is a shared data
structure responsible for storing all transactional history to
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date. The blocks are connected with each other in the form
of a chain. The first block of the chain is known as Genesis.
Each block consists of a Block Header, Transaction
Counter and Transaction. The structure of blockchain is
given in Table 1.
Each block in the chain is identified by a hash in the
header. The hash is unique and generated by the Secure
Hash Algorithm (SHA-256). SHA takes any size plain-
text and calculates a fixed size 256-bit cryptographic hash.
Each header contains the address of the previous block in the
chain. The process of adding blocks in the blockchain is
called ‘‘mining of blocks’’. If miners mine a valid block, it
publishes the block in the blockchain and extends the
blockchain by one new block. The creator of the block is
rewarded with BTC. In this work, we assume that miners are
honest and follow the protocol as described thus far.
Electricity, one of the necessities of today’s society, can
be considered as renewable if it is generated from renew-
able resources. For example, solar energy, hydro-power,
and windmill power are renewable versions of electricity.
There are also non-renewable types if it is produced from
thermal power plants that use coal—a non-renewable
resource. So, depending on if renewable non-renewable
resources, it is considered semi-renewable.
Exploitation of a shared resource is a significant prob-
lem [5]. Since electricity can be considered a semi-re-
newable resource, we have seen an unexpected growth of
electricity (or computational power) consumption resulting
from BTC mining [21, 22]. This has brought many miners
to despair because the reward of mining a bitcoin decreases
every 4 years by 50%. Therefore, miners need to mine
BTC strategically to make BTC mining a long lasting
activity that remains prosperous. However, there are still
transaction fees that can keep the BTC market prof-
itable for many years to come. In this paper, we use the
tools of dynamic game theory to solve a novel dynamic
game model. Our game model can be stated as follows: a
miner’s objective is to use more powerful (computation-
ally) mining systems that consume more electricity, in
order to maximize the net profit gain from producing or
mining BTC. They can then sell the gained BTC to the
prevailing market at the current market value.
We propose two ways to maximize the profit of miners:
cooperative—all miners cooperate and decide to consume
some fixed amount of electricity and in return, they get
BTC market price as profit so, they jointly maximize their
profit and the profit is equally shared among them—and
non-cooperative—each miner behaves selfishly and indi-
vidually wants to maximize the profit gained from BTC
mining.
Although this work is motivated by BTC, it is more
heavily influenced by the future of Blockchain. The work and
game theoretic model presented here can be applicable to
other mining systems that utilize a similar mining system to
BTC, therefore well versed in many different potential
Blockchain applications [3, 16, 30]. Furthermore, the work
presented here can be easily adapted to other mining schemes
in the future making this a pivotal model and work on game
theory and its relation to the mining process for Blockchain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We survey
some of the closest related works next in Sect. 2. We fol-
low this with the formulation of our mode in Sect. 3. We
then give our main results in Sect. 4 with solutions to the
concepts presented in Section 3. We based our results with
some discussion on how to enforce social optimality in
Sect. 5. Finally, we conclude this paper with some remarks
in Sect. 6.
2 Related work
Since the early days of BTC, blockchain technology and
cryptocurrencies have caught the attention of both
researchers and investors alike. The original paper on BTC
was improved in [23], mostly focussing on security anal-
ysis. Showing an attack in which large pools can gain more
than their fair share, Eyal et al. showed that BTC mining
protocol is not incentive compatible [10], which was a
significant work.
The linear quadratic differential game is the best-re-
searched class of dynamic games (see Engwerda [9]).
Dynamic games with linear quadratic structure and with
linear state dependent constraints were studied by Singh
and Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel in [26, 27] but in the discrete
time horizon.
Zohar et al. [18] examined dynamics of pooled mining
and the rewards that pools manage to collect. They use
cooperative game theoretic tools to analyze how pool
members may share these rewards. They showed that for
some network parameters, especially under high transac-
tion loads, it is difficult or even impossible to distribute
rewards stably: some participants are always given incen-
tives to switch between pools. The work of Niyato et al.
[20] shows how to model blockchain technology as a
cooperative game, in which cloud providers can cooperate.
They show a novel solution of the core issues can be found
using linear programming.
Table 1 Structure of the blockchain [19]
Field Size
Block header 80 bytes
Block size 4 bytes
Transaction counter 1 to 9 bytes
Transaction Depends on the transaction size
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Kiayias considered the Blockchain Mining Game with
incomplete information as a stochastic dynamic game in
discrete time [15]. They considered two types of strategies.
First they considered when miners release every mined
block immediately and secondly when a block is mined and
announced immediately but not released. The latter causes
other miners to continue mining transactions that will soon
be committed. Miners are always strategic in choosing
which blocks to mine. As a result of their research, they
found that the best response of a miners with low com-
putational power matches the expected behaviour of BTC
designers while for the miner with sizeable computational
power, he/she deviates from the expected behaviour, and
other Nash equilibria arise.
Salimitari discussed the mining profitability of a new
miner or pool by calculating the expected value of profit
[24]. In their model, they assume the cost of mining was
linear to the price of electricity consumed in the mining
process. Hayes studied the model to check the marginal
cost of production and proposed to set the market value of
the digital BTC currency [13]. They show that the marginal
cost of production of BTC plays an essential role in
explaining BTC prices.
Houy considered the BTC mining game where they
studied the mining incentives as a decision regarding how
many transactions they should include in the block they are
mining in order to win the game and update the block first
[14]. Harvey et al. considered the model of miners’ prof-
itability from the mining cost analysis of the electrical
energy invested in bitcoin mining production [11]. They
also show that how the profit model changes as mining
scales from the individual to the industrial level.
Laszka et al. consider a game-theoretic model that
allows capturing short term as well as long-term impacts of
attacks against mining pools [17]. Using this model, they
studied the conditions under which the mining pools have
no incentives to cheat against each other and the conditions
under which one mining pool is marginalized by cheating.
Our model is not a one shot game model or static game
model. It is a dynamic game meaning that players make a
decision at each time instant that is based on amount of
resource—electricity available at that time instant. To the
best of author’s knowledge, such dynamic games have
never appeared before.
3 Formulation of the model
We consider a continuous time dynamic game model of
exploitation of a semi-renewable resource—electricity.
Since electricity is produced from renewable resource or
partly from renewable and partly from non-renewable
resource in constant proportion and for simplicity by
‘‘electricity’’, we mean the stock of this resource.
The game G^ consists of the following parts:
GP1. The set of players: I ¼ f1; 2; . . .; ng. Players can be
either individual miners or mining pools.
GP2. The state of resource x is the stock of resource used
for electric energy production which may be used
for mining—proportional to the amount of avail-
able computational power and to the maximal
available electricity consumption for mining. Since
there is nothing like negative amounts of compu-
tational power and it is not zero, we assume that
x 2 ð0;þ1Þ with the initial state Xð0Þ ¼ x0 repre-
senting the initial amount of resource (we use
notation X for trajectories, i.e., state as a function of
time, and x for state, so we can write XðtÞ ¼ x).
GP3. At each time instant t, miner i decides to consume si
amount of electricity, which we call strategy of
miner i. These si in common constitute a profile of
strategies and is defined as s ¼ ðs1; . . .; snÞ. Denote
a function by Si and defined as SiðXðtÞÞ ¼ si.
Therefore, at time instant t, seeing that X(t) amount
of power is available, miner i will use strategy
SiðXðtÞÞ.
GP4. The set of decisions of each miner is Ui ¼ Rþ,
representing intensity of electricity use. However,
there are state dependent constraints on decisions.
GP5. Given state x, the set of available decisions is
U iðxÞ ¼ ½0;Mx (the closed interval), for some
constant M[ 1. So, for every miner i, mining
strategy si 2 ½0;Mx. This represents a real situation
where a miner cannot consume more than the
intensity of electricity consumption available to
him/her, or a negative amount of electricity. We
denote the set of decision profiles by Uni .
GP6. We consider the economic scenario where a BTC
miner i invests some amount of electricity to the
mining system in order to solve a ‘‘Proof of Work’’
problem. As a result of successfully mining a block
into the blockchain, he produces BTC. He/she sells
BTC into the common-market for a fixed market
price of BTC—in order to concentrate on problems
related to energy consumption, we skip the exoge-
nous randomness of BTC price. Mining, however,
may end up with a failure. Efficiency (measured in
expected value of the reward in dollars) in this
process of a unit of energy consumption by a miner
is a decreasing function of joint energy consump-
tion by all miners. (This efficiency plays a role
similar to price in economic models of oligopolies
defined by the so called inverse demand function).
We consider a simple approximation.
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EfficiencyðsÞ ¼ P
Xn
j¼1
sj ð3:1Þ
for some positive constant P.
GP7. The cost of mining for miner i in dollars, is linearly
proportional to the price of electricity consumed i.e.
si.
CostðsiÞ ¼ C  si
for some positive C. We assume that the cost of
mining is identical for each miner.
GP8. So, in this economic model, the net profit of each
miner is given by the expected net revenue minus
the mining cost. So, the current or instantaneous
payoff or profit gi of miner i is given by
giðx; si; s iÞ ¼EfficiencyðsÞ  si  CostðsiÞ
¼ P
Xn
j¼1
sj
 !
si  Csi;
ð3:2Þ
where s i is a way in which we denote the vector
of consumptions of the other miners. Whenever we
consider profiles in which decisions of the others
are identical, by a slight abuse of notation, we write
this single decision only, not the whole vector.
In economics generally, P is substantially higher
than C.
GP9. A function X : ð0;þ1Þ ! Rþ is called a trajectory
of the state of the system and given by
_XðtÞ ¼ w XðtÞ; SðXðtÞÞð Þ;
with the initial condition Xð0Þ ¼ x0;
ð3:3Þ
for the state transition function w, describing the
behaviour of the system dynamics:
wðx; sÞ ¼ nx
Xn
j¼1
sj; ð3:4Þ
where 0\n\1 is called the regeneration rate of
electricity, which is semi-renewable.
GP10. We are interested in calculating the feedback
strategies Si : ð0;þ1Þ ! Rþ such that the con-
straint is fulfilled and Eq. (3.3) has a unique
solution. It means that the intensity of electricity
consumption that s/he decides to use at every time
instant t depends on X(t). The set of such strategies
is denoted by Si.
GP11. The payoffs of miners in the game are discounted
and the interest rate used for discounting is
r 2 ð0; 1Þ. This is typical for economic problems.
If we look at discrete time and yearly interest rate,
then for 1 dollar at the bank account we will get 1 þ r
after a year. So, the present value of a dollar which
we are going to obtain after a year is 1
1þr, while the
present value of a dollar which we are going to
obtain after t years is 1ð1þrÞt. If the bank pays the
interest more and more often, then it uses a
continuous time limit of this process ert instead of
1
ð1þrÞt, and this works also for t that is an arbitrary real
number. We assume that n
2
 r n\\ðP CÞ.
GP12. The total payoff function or total profit of a miner
given the initial state x0, a strategy of player i Si and
strategies of the remaining players S i is
Ji x0; ½Si; S ið Þ
¼
Z1
t¼0
ertgiðXðtÞ; SiðXðtÞÞ; S iðXðtÞÞÞdt;
ð3:5Þ
for i ¼ 1; 2; . . .n and for X given by Eq. (3.3). The
notation ½Si; S i is a convenient way of writing a
strategy profile S emphasizing the special role of
player i in it.
Analogously, we can define Ji x; ½Si; S ið Þ for
arbitrary initial x 0. If it does lead to confusion,
we will also use shorter form Ji x; Sð Þ.
4 Solution for BTC mining model
Here we discuss the solution types for our BTC mining
game.
Social Optimum mining profile A social optimum
mining profile is defined as a solution to our mining game
where all miners cooperate. In other words, it is a profile
where all miners jointly maximize their current payoffs or
profits. A social optimum mining profile can be the result
of decision making by a single miner, known as a social
planner, or just full cooperation of all miners.
Definition 1 A mining profile S is called a social optimum
mining profile in the n miner BTC mining game if and only
if S maximizes
Pn
i¼1
Jiðx0; SÞ.
Nash equilibrium mining profile A Nash equilibrium
mining profile is defined as a solution of our mining game
where all miners behave selfishly and do not cooperate
with each other. A mining profile S is a Nash equilibrium if
no miner can benefit from unilateral deviation from it.
Formally it can be defined as follows.
Definition 2 A mining profile S is called a Nash equi-
librium if and only if for every miner i 2 I and for every
mining strategy Si of miner i,
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Ji x; ½Si; S ið Þ Ji x; ½ Si; S ið Þ for all x: ð4:1Þ
We will also use another solution concept—a myopic
Nash equilibrium—a profile of strategies in which each of
the players maximizes his/her current payoff. Such profiles
often appear in dynamic games with many players, in
which players treat their influence of the state variable as
negligible.
Definition 3 A mining profile S is called a greedy or
myopic Nash equilibrium if and only if for every miner
i 2 I and for every x and every mining decision si 2 ½0;Mx
of miner i,
gi x; si; S iðxÞð Þ gi x; SiðxÞ; S iðxÞð Þ for all x: ð4:2Þ
4.1 Calculation of social optimum
First, we calculate the social optimum strategy profile—
solution of the cooperative game and the value function—
the total profit of a cooperative miner.
Consider the total profit J x; Sð Þ ¼P
n
i¼1
Ji x; ½Si; S ið Þ,
then the dynamic optimization problem of finding a social
optimum mining profile is defined by
sup
S2Sn
J x0; Sð Þ; ð4:3aÞ
_XðtÞ ¼ nXðtÞ 
Xn
i¼1
SiðXðtÞÞ; ð4:3bÞ
Xð0Þ ¼ x0: ð4:3cÞ
Theorem 1 The optimal solution for cooperation of all
miners is given by
llS SOi ðxÞ :¼
0 0 x\x^0;
ð2n rÞ2nxþ ðPCÞðr nÞ
2nn
x^0 x\x^1;
PC
2n
x x^1:
8
>>><
>>:
ð4:4Þ
for the constant x^0 ¼ ðPCÞðrnÞ2nðr2nÞ ; x^1 ¼ PC2n .
We call this optimal solution ‘‘a social optimum
profile’’.
The combined total profit of all miners for this social
optimum mining profile is given by
V SO ðxÞ :¼
x
x^0
 r
n Hx^0
2
2
þ Gx^0 þ K
 
0 x\x^0;
Hx2
2
þ Gxþ K x^0  x\x^1;
ðP CÞ2
4r
x x^1:
8
>>>><
>>>>:
ð4:5Þ
for constants H ¼ 2ðr  2nÞ; G ¼ ðPCÞðr2nÞn and
K ¼ ðPCÞ2ðrnÞ
2
4rn2
.
The total payoff or profit of an individual miner i is
given by
VSOi ðxÞ :¼
VSOðxÞ
n
: ð4:6Þ
This optimal total payoff is called the ‘‘value function’’ of
miner i at the social optimum profile.
One of the methods to find the optimal control is by
solving the Bellman or Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB)
equation—a partial differential equation which is central to
optimal control theory (see Haurie, Krawczyk and Zaccour
[12], Bas¸ar and Olsder [6], Zabczyk [32], Stokey Lucas
[29]). The HJB equation is assumed to return the value
function V as a function of state, with V(x) being the
maximal payoff if the system starts from x as the initial
condition. In the infinite horizon problem with discounting
with the rate r, the HJB equation is of the form rVðxÞ ¼
max
s
f current payoff ðsÞ þ oVðxÞox  state transition ðx; sÞg
for each x, where s is the control parameter. If a regular
solution V of the HJB equation exists, an optimal control
can be found as the maximizer of the right hand side of the
HJB equation with the actual value function V. In the
infinite horizon, a sufficient condition for a continuously
differentiable function V to be the value function and a
feedback control s to be optimal is that V fulfils the HJB
equation, s maximizes its right hand side and V fulfils the
terminal condition lim sup
t!1
VðXðtÞÞert ¼ 0 for every
admissible trajectory of the state. Since in our problem, the
state is one dimensional, the HJB equation becomes an
ordinary differential equation.
Proof The Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation for any
function V(x) can be written as
rVðxÞ ¼ sup
si2½0;Mxn
Xn
i¼1
P C 
Xn
j¼1
sj
 !
si
" #
þ nx
Xn
j¼1
sj
 !
oVðxÞ
ox
: ð4:7Þ
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To calculate the optimal strategy Si, differentiate the right
hand side of Eq. (4.7) with respect to si and equate to 0. We
get the optimal value si as
2si ¼ P C 
Xn
j ¼ 1; j 6¼ i
sj  oVðxÞox ; i ¼ 1; 2. . .n:
ð4:8Þ
Note that the right hand side of Eq. (4.8) with si subtracted
from both sides is identical for all i. So, the optimal value si
is the same for all n miners.
Since M is sufficiently large, the optimal value si is
always less than or equal to Mx.
Now, a candidate for the social optimum value function
can be found by solving the following the differential
equation for given optimal si and a function V(x),
rVðxÞ ¼ n P C  nsið Þsi þ oVðxÞox nx nsið Þ: ð4:9Þ
The quadratic structure of the social optimum problem
suggests that the value function is of quadratic form.
Therefore, we assume that the value function has the form
VðxÞ ¼ K þ Gxþ Hx
2
2
; ð4:10Þ
for some constants H, G and K. Since this equation has to
hold for all x, the coefficients of x2; x and the constant term
on the left-hand side and the right-hand side have to be
equal. This yields two sets of values of the constants:
ðiÞ H ¼ 2ðr  2nÞ;G ¼ ðP CÞðr  2nÞ
n
;
K ¼ðP CÞ
2ðr  nÞ2
4rn2
;
ð4:11Þ
ðiiÞ H^ ¼0; G^ ¼ 0; K^ ¼ ðP CÞ
2
4r
; ð4:12Þ
Case 1 If the constants are as in (i), then the optimal
solution is si ¼ ð2rÞCxþnRðr1ÞnC , only if 0 si\Mx.
(a) For 0 x\x^0, the zero-derivative si 0 so, for this
interval of x, the optimal strategy will be si ¼ 0. Thus,
player i will wait with the waiting time tðxÞ, without
any energy consumption for X(t) to grow from x at 0 to
x^0 at tðxÞ. The dynamics of the electricity becomes:
dXðtÞ
dt
¼ nXðtÞ;Xð0Þ ¼ x. Solving the differential equa-
tion forX givesXðtÞ ¼ xent. So, xent ¼ x^0. Solving this
for t ¼ tðxÞ we have the waiting time as
tðxÞ ¼ lnðx^0ÞlnðxÞn . The value function for this interval
of x is given by ertðxÞ Hx^0
2
2
þ Gx^0 þ K
 
, which
simplifies to x
x^0
 r
n Hx^0
2
2
þ Gx^0 þ K
 
.
(b) For x^0  x\x^1, the optimal decision is si ¼
ð2rÞCxþnRðr1Þ
nC
and the value function is
Hx2
2
þ Gxþ K.
Case 2 If the constants are as in (ii), then the optimal
solution is si ¼ PC2n only if 0 si\Mx and the value
function is K^ ¼ ðPCÞ2
4r
.
The function VSO defined by Eq. (4.6), composed from
Case 1 and Case 2, is continuous and continuously
differentiable, it fulfils the HJB equation and the profile
SSO defined by Eq. (4.4) maximizes the rhs. of the HJB
equation with VSO. The terminal condition is trivially
fulfilled since VSO is bounded.
Therefore, the social optimum strategy profile is given
by Eq. (4.4) while the total profit of a miner is given by
Eq. (4.6). h
4.2 Calculation of Nash equilibrium
Next, we illustrate the process of calculation of a Nash
equilibrium strategy profile and we derive the unique
greedy/myopic Nash equilibrium—solution of the non-co-
operative game and the total profit of a selfish miner cor-
responding to it.
Given the strategies of the remaining miners S i, the
optimization problem of miner i is defined by
sup
Si2½0;Mx
Ji x0; ½Si; S ið Þ ð4:13aÞ
_XðtÞ ¼ nXðtÞ  SiðXðtÞÞ 
Xn
j ¼ 1; j 6¼ i
SjðXðtÞÞ; ð4:13bÞ
Xð0Þ ¼ x0: ð4:13cÞ
However, a feedback Nash equilibrium, besides solving
n dynamic optimization problems, requires finding a fixed
point of the resulting best response correspondence (in the
space of feedback profiles). Presence of constraints on
energy consumption dependent on x makes the problem so
compound that it is not solvable in a way analogous to that
used in the proof Theorem 1, i.e. using the undetermined
coefficient method assuming quadratic value function for
the model without constraints, then replacing the solution
at points of violation of constraints pointwise by the vio-
lated constraint and proposing the total payoff for the
resulting solution as the candidate for the value function
and checking the sufficient condition.
Theorem 2
(a) The problem cannot be solved in a way analogous to
the proof of Theorem 1.
(b) A profile defined by
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S NEi ðxÞ ¼
Mx x\~x0
P C
nþ 1 x ~x0:
8
<
: ð4:14Þ
for ~x0 ¼ PCMðnþ1Þ is a myopic Nash equilibrium strat-
egy profile.
The total payoff or profit of miner i at this myopic Nash
equilibrium strategy profile is given by
V NEi ðxÞ¼
Hx2
2
þ Gxþ K x\~x0
VIðxÞþ er~tðxÞ
H~x20
2
þ G~x0þ K
 
~x0x\~x1
ðPCÞ2
rðnþ1Þ2 x ~x1:
8
>>>><
>>>>>:
ð4:15Þ
for constants H ¼ 2M2n
2nr2nM ; G ¼ MðPCÞrþnMn ; K ¼ 0: ~x1 ¼
nðPCÞ
ðnþ1Þn ; ~tðxÞ ¼ ln nMnð Þ PþCð Þn xPþCð Þnþn xð ÞM
 
n1 and VIðxÞ ¼  Pð
CÞ2 nMnð Þ PþCð Þn xPþCð Þnþn xð ÞM
 rn1
 
r1 nþ 1ð Þ2:
Proof (a) We start the proof similarly to the proof of
Theorem 1, by an attempt to derive a preliminary candi-
date, we modify it to encompass constraints and check a
sufficient condition.
Fix any i and consider the optimization problem of
player i given strategies of the others Sj symmetric. The
Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation for any function ViðxÞ
can be written as
rViðxÞ ¼ sup
si2½0;Mx
P C 
Xn
j¼1;j 6¼i
SjðxÞ  si
 !
si
þ nx si 
Xn
j ¼ 1; j 6¼ i
SjðxÞ
0
B@
1
CA
oViðxÞ
ox
:
ð4:16Þ
To calculate the optimal mining strategy si, differentiate
the right hand side of Eq. (4.16) with respect to si and
equate to 0. We get the zero-derivative point si as
2si ¼ P C 
Xn
j ¼ 1; j 6¼ i
SjðxÞ  oViðxÞox ; i ¼ 1; 2. . .n:
ð4:17Þ
Since the problem is symmetric and the current payoff
strictly concave, we look for symmetric solutions i.e. such
that SjðxÞ ¼ si, and, consequently, Vi ¼ Vj.
Now, a candidate for a symmetric Nash equilibrium
value function can be found by solving the following
differential equation for given optimal si and a function
ViðxÞ,
rViðxÞ ¼ P C  nsið Þsi þ oViðxÞox nx nsið Þ: ð4:18Þ
The quadratic structure of the problem suggests that the
value function is of quadratic form. Therefore, we assume
that the value function has the form
ViðxÞ ¼ K þ Gxþ Hx
2
2
; ð4:19Þ
We substitute it to Eq. (4.18), and write equations for the
coefficients. We get two sets of values of the constants:
(i) H ¼ ðnþ1Þ2ðr2nÞ
2n2
; G ¼ ðn2þ1ÞðPCÞðr2nÞ
2n2n and K ¼
ðrn2þr2nÞðrn2þr2n2nÞðPCÞ2
4n2n2ðnþ1Þ2r and (ii)
H ¼ 0, G ¼ 0,
K ¼ ðPCÞ2
rðnþ1Þ2.
We substitute SiðxÞ ¼ si from Eq. (4.17) to each of them
and we get that in case (i), SiðxÞ[Mx for small x and for
all x ~x0 the trajectory originating from such an x is
strictly decreasing (so it eventually end in the region of x in
which SiðxÞ[Mx), while for (ii), SiðxÞMx for x ~x0. So,
as a natural candidate for the Nash equilibrium strategy, we
take S NEi . We calculate Jiðx; S NE Þ and we get V NEi
as follows.
(1) For 0 x\~x0, the candidate for Nash equilibrium
strategy is Mx and if the initial condition is in this
area, X(t) remains in it. So, we get a quadratic
function with the coefficients of x2, x and constant
H ¼ 2M2n
2nr2nM, G ¼ MðPCÞrþnMn, K ¼ 0. Therefore, the
candidate for the value function in this case is given
by 2M
2n
2ð2nr2MnÞ
x2
2
þ MðPCÞ
rþMnn x.
(2) If x ~x1, then not only PCnþ1 Mx, but ~x1 is a steady
state of dynamics with strategies PC
nþ1 , since nx
nðPCÞ
nþ1 ¼ 0 and each trajectory originating from this
set is nondecreasing. So, if the initial condition is in
this set, it remains in it. The payoff for x ~x1 and
SNE is given by Jiðx; SNEÞ ¼ ðPCÞ
2
rðnþ1Þ2.
(3) For the initial condition ~x0  x\~x1, the trajectory X
corresponding to PC
nþ1 decreases over time. So, after
time ~tðxÞ it will reach the set in which the strategy is
Mx. It is given by Xð~tðxÞÞ ¼ ~x0, with the dynamics of
the electricity
dXðtÞ
dt
¼ nXðtÞ  nðPCÞðnþ1Þ ;Xð0Þ ¼ x: Solv-
ing this differential equation and inverting gives
~tðxÞ ¼ ln nMnð Þ PþCð Þn xPþCð Þnþn xð ÞM
 
n1:
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The payoff for x in this interval is given by Jiðx; SNEÞ ¼
er~tðxÞ H~x0
2
2
þ G~x0 þ K
 
þ R
~tðxÞ
0
ertgi x; PCnþ1 ;
PC
nþ1
 
dt.
Although the Bellman equation is fulfilled in (1) and (2)
and SNEi maximizes its right hand side in those sets, for
~x0  x\~x1, SNEi does not maximize the right hand side of
the Bellman equation with VNEi . Moreover, the function
VNEi is not only non-differentiable at ~x1, but its derivative
tends to þ1 as x tends to ~x1 from below. So, standard tools
do not work. The latest results for solving such irregular
problems with infinite horizon by Baumeister et al. [7]
cannot be applied either since our model does not fulfil the
strong assumptions of [7].
b) It is easy to check that the profile SNE, which was
derived in the proof of a), maximizes giðx; si; SNE iÞ.
Therefore, a greedy Nash equilibrium strategy profile is
given by Eq. (4.14), while the total profit of a miner at this
profile is given by Eq. (4.15).
To show that SNE is the unique greedy Nash equilibrium,
we first look for the zero-derivative point of optimization
of player i. We get the unique solution
2si ¼ P C 
Xn
j ¼ 1; j 6¼ i
SjðxÞ; i ¼ 1; 2. . .n: ð4:20Þ
Subtracting si from both sides yields identical rhs for all i,
so, all si are identical. The maximized function is strictly
concave, so maxima are si ¼ PCnþ1 , if it does not exceed Mx,
while otherwise all of them are Mx. h
Next, we graphically show the total profit and mining
strategy for both: the social optimum and the unique
greedy/myopic Nash equilibrium case. Figures 1 and 2 are
drawn for the values of constants: M ¼ 2; P ¼
11511; C ¼ 5:327; n ¼ 10; n ¼ 0:03; r ¼ 0:02.
Figure 1 shows the total profit earned by a miner in USD
by consuming electricity strategically, depending on the
optimal strategy profile (see Fig. 2): both in the cooperative
or non-cooperative case. In Fig. 2, an interesting property
of optimal strategy profile is that for x x^0, miners refrain
from mining in order to let the energy resource to regen-
erate. For the same x, at a myopic Nash equilibrium, miners
use electricity with the maximal available intensity, leading
to fast depletion of the resource.
5 Enforcing social optimality by a tax-
subsidy system
In this section, we consider a tax system or penalty system
which can be implemented by an external authority. Some
work before on this topic can be seen in [1, 2]. We provide
this system only as an example for future cryptocurrencies
as this system would be difficult to implement at this stage
in BTC.
If the miners consume more electricity than the social
optimum or social welfare level, then they pay an extra
amount to the external authority for the amount of elec-
tricity consumed in excess of the social welfare level as
defined by the authority. This introduction of a tax system
is essential in order to maintain the equilibrium in a
cryptocurrency society and to make electricity sustainable.
If we will not be able to control electricity consumption,
then, besides contributing to the greenhouse effect, it may
lead to a serious electricity crisis in the near future.
We want to make sure that miners behave in a socially
optimal manner which is for the welfare of society through
a tax system or a tax-subsidy system which is linear to the
miner’s strategy si i.e.,
Tax ðx; siÞ ¼ sðxÞsi: ð5:1Þ
Formally, introduction of a tax or a tax-subsidy system is a
modification of the original non-cooperative game by
changing the payoffs. In our mining game model, the
current payoff function of miner i changes to
P C 
Xn
i¼1
si
 !
si  Tax ðx; siÞ: ð5:2Þ
We are interested in Pigovian type tax where tax is linear in
surplus over the socially optimal level. For those readers
unfamiliar with Pigovian tax, we refer them to more
background information in [25, 31]. To summarize here, if
a given miner consumes more energy than the social
optimum level he/she has to pay an extra amount as a
penalty for overuse of energy in mining beyond the socially
optimal level. We have seen related work shown in [28].
Fig. 1 Total profit of a miner at a greedy Nash equilibrium and the
social optimum
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Tax ðx; siÞ ¼ sðxÞ si  S SOi ðxÞ
 þ
: ð5:3Þ
Therefore, the total payoff function in the mining game
becomes
Jsi x; ½Si; S ið Þ ¼
Z1
t¼0
ert P C 
Xn
j¼1
SjðXðtÞÞ
 !
SiðXðtÞÞ  sðXðtÞÞ SiðXðtÞÞð
S SOi ðXðtÞÞ
þ
dt:
ð5:4Þ
Definition 4 A tax-subsidy system enforces the mining
profile S if S is a Nash equilibrium mining strategy in the
new mining game with the total payoff defined by
Eq. (5.4).
Theorem 3 The tax rate, enforcing the socially optimal
behaviour of the miners is given by
sðxÞ¼max 2nxðr2nÞþðPCÞð3nrÞ
n2
;
ðn1ÞðPCÞ
2n
 
:
ð5:5Þ
Figure 3 presents the tax rate of a linear tax enforcing
strategy in the socially optimal profile. We can see that the
less electricity resource is left, the more substantial tax
rates are required.
Proof Consider the game with enforcing the social opti-
mum strategy profile. If a miner mines S SOi then there is
no tax to be paid or subsidy to be obtained. So, if every
miner play S SOi , each of them obtains the total profit
V SOi ðxÞ and this is the optimal total profit for such an
appropriate sðxÞ, if it exists. So, the HJB equation for
V SOi ðxÞ (given the others players play S SOj ) becomes
rV SOi ðxÞ ¼ sup
si2½0;Mx
PC si
Xn
j¼1;j 6¼i
S SOj ðxÞ
 !
si
 sðxÞ si S SOi ðxÞ
 þ
þ nx si
Xn
j¼ 1; j 6¼ i
S SOj
0
B@
1
CA
oV SOi ðxÞ
ox
:
ð5:6Þ
We start from x\x^0 and we are going to find a tax rate for
which another function, PC si
Pn
j¼1;j6¼i
S SOj ðxÞ
 !
si sðxÞ si S SOi ðxÞ
 þ
þ nx si
Pn
j¼ 1; j 6¼ i
S SOj
0
@
1
A
oV SO
i
ðxÞ
ox ; is maximized. So, the first order condition for the
above optimization problem is
~si ¼ 4n
2xþ ððn 2ÞðP CÞ  2rx nsÞnþ rðP CÞ
nnðnþ 1Þ :
ð5:7Þ
We want the optimal solution to be attained at maxf0; ~sig
¼ SSOi . This holds for sðxÞ ¼ 2nxðr2nÞþðPCÞð3nrÞn2 —substi-
tute ~si for this sðxÞ into Eq. (5.6) to see that it is fulfilled.
For x[ x^0, the analogous solution is
ðn1ÞðPCÞ
2n
and
Eq. (5.6) is also fulfilled.
Since the tax rate is multiplied by the nonnegative part
of si  SSOi , increasing the tax rate does not spoil the
property of enforcing. So, to get a solution that works in all
cases, we take maximum of those two. Eq. (5.6) is then
fulfilled for all x. h
Fig. 3 Tax rate sðxÞ enforcing the socially optimal profile for the
values of constants: M ¼ 2; P ¼ 11511; C ¼ 5:327; n ¼ 10;
n ¼ 0:03; r ¼ 0:02
Fig. 2 Optimal strategy of a miner at a greedy Nash equilibrium and
the social optimum
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6 Conclusions
We view electricity as a semi-renewable resource, so it is
essential to use it strategically in order to maintain the
sustainability of the resource. In this paper, we consider a
continuous time dynamic game model of BTC mining in
Blockchain with infinite time horizon, which belongs to the
class of differential games. Although motivated by BTC,
work here is applicable in other resource mining based
Blockchain technologies currently and in the future. We
propose two types of solutions to our model, namely
Cooperative (Social Optimum) mining strategy, and Non-
Cooperative (Nash equilibrium and myopic Nash equilib-
rium) mining strategy. We calculate the total profit of a
miner in both cases. We have found that it is always
beneficial for the miners to consume or to use electricity
jointly, in cooperation with the others. Cooperation gives
the miner a higher total profit compared to a situation when
all miners mine selfishly. Moreover, if all miners choose to
mine according to a greedy Nash equilibrium mining
strategy, then the electricity resource will be depleted,
while it is sustainable if they choose to mine according to
the social optimum strategy. Our result fits nicely with the
common belief that mining in cooperation will be better
than mining individually in a non-cooperative game. We
also propose a tax system which falls into the Pigovian tax
category, linear in overuse of electricity by the miner, in
order to enforce social optimality in our BTC dynamic
game model. This way, miners will be forced to behave and
to mine in a way that is best for the social welfare of the
miners and guarantees sustainability of the resource.
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